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Professional Responsibility-A Constitutional Challenge

to Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C)
In a recent and unprecedented decision' a federal district court
ruled that the application of Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C)" of the
New York State Code of Professional Responsibility,3 which prohibits

the payment of expert witnesses on a contingent fee basis, violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The memorandum and order in Person v. Association of the Bar of
New York4 grants to all litigants in the Eastern District of New York
involved in civil actions the right to retain expert witnesses on a contingent payment basis. The court premised its holding on a finding
that the rule "must particularly forbid to the less affluent and to the

indigent a means of obtaining an equal hearing to that accorded to a
more affluent adversary in the same case." 5 Person marks an unwarranted expansion of the due process and equal protection tests
prescribed by the United States Supreme Court; and heralds the dis-

integration of a heretofore unquestioned standard of legal ethical conduct.

7

1. Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y.
1976).
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-109(C) provides:
A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the
payment of:
( 1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying.
(2) Reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or
testifying.
(3) A reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.
3. The instant case dealt specifically with the Lawyers Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated by the Association of the Bar of New York City. Reference
will be made, however, to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, since the New
York Bar and every state bar association (with the exception of California) have
adopted the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility in whole or in part. See ABA
ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY i (unverified draft 1975).
4. 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
5. Id. at 146.
6. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-80 (1971) (absent countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced into judicial process must
be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard; a person may not be deprived of a
fundamental right regardless of validity of the legitimate exercise of state power);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (reasonable basis test); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (compelling governmental interest necessary to
penalize the exercise of a constitutional right).
7. Cf. in re Shapiro, 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N.Y.S. 852 (1911) (holding
contingent compensation agreements with witnesses violative of public policy); S.
WILLISTON, CONTRAcrs § 1716, at 879 (3d ed. 1972) (stating the basic premise of the
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Person, s an attorney prosecuting an antitrust case, applied for the
convening of a three judge court" to enjoin the enforcement of DR 7109(C). 1" He alleged inter alia that the cost of the antitrust litigation
had become so prohibitive that his client, plaintiff in the pending litigation, could not bear the expense of hiring an expert witness, although
in contrast, wealthy industrial defendants in such cases usually could
afford and did retain experts to aid in their defense." It was further
alleged that the application of the rule resulted in a legally enforced
disparity in treatment that transgressed the litigant's constitutional right
to access to the courts. 12 Person reasoned that the denial of the right
to retain an expert witness essentially denigrates the right to litigate
fully one's civil action, since expert testimony is often indispensable in
the prosecution of antitrust litigation.
After a consideration of New York law, 3 the district court found
rule); ABA ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 98-99 (unverified draft

1975) (no state has made significant changes in the rule).
8. A question arose whether Person had standing to bring suit on behalf of his
clients. Judge Dooling addressed this point in cursory fashion as follows:
It is the plaintiff who is the one directly restricted by the Rule and rendered
less effective than . . . he would be if able [to retain] expert testimony uninhibited by [DR 7-109(C)] ....
• . . [B]ut while the disciplinary rule, of necessity, directly affects the
lawyer, it affects the client's underlying interest [in having genuine access to
the courts] more drastically.
414 F. Supp. at 145.
The case was decided on the basis of the client's right of access to the courts. In
regard to whether Person's interest and his relationship to his clients were substantial
enough to confer standing upon him, see Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2871-76
(1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
9. Pursuant to Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 988 (formerly 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281 (1970)), which required that no injunction restraining the enforcement, operation
or execution of any state statute due to its unconstitutionality shall be granted unless
the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
This statute was later repealed. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119.
10. Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.N.Y.
1976). Two opinions are dealt with in this Note. The first, reported at 414 F. Supp.
139 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), dealt with the denial of the convening of a three judge court.
The second, reported at 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), declared DR 7-109(C)
unconstitutional.
11. 414 F. Supp. at 140. It was also alleged that experts who regularly testify for
large industrial concerns are influenced as expert witnesses due to a continuing relationship between the two. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 143. The court cited In re Schapiro, 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N.Y.S. 852
(1911); Laffin v. Billington, 86 N.Y.S. 267 (App. Div. 1904); and ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF NEw YORK COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 213 (1932)

&

No. 76 (1927-1928), all of which give support to DR 7-109(C). Wellington v. Kelly,
84 N.Y. 543 (1881), stands as virtually the only New York case allowing a contingent
payment agreement with a witness for the production of critical testimony.
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that the New York State Bar Committee would not likely acquiesce in
Person's prospective violation of DR 7-109(C) in view of that state's
strong renunciation of contingent payments to witnesses. 14 Since Person had not as yet contracted with an expert witness, however, any enforcement of DR 7-109(C) in the form of a disbarment proceeding was
necessarily premature.'5 Therefore, the district court correctly denied
Person's motion to convene the three judge panel.
Three months later Person moved for a summary declaratory
judgment' " to invalidate DR 7-109(C) based essentially on the allegations filed in the earlier action. 17 The court accepted without question plaintiff's contention that he was disadvantaged in the pending
antitrust case because of his client's financial inability to obtain accountApparently without supporting facts,
ing and economic testimony.'
the court also accepted that this predicament recurred frequently in the
plaintiff's antitrust practice.'" Having identified a pattern of "recurrent" discrimination as a result of imminent state enforcement of DR
7-109(C), the court, relying on Boddie v. Connecticut20 and Winters

v. Miller,2' found a deprivation of plaintiff's access to the courts. In
light of traditional constitutional practice,22 the court then balanced the
denial of plaintiff's access to the courts with the basis and purpose of
the rule.
The court observed that DR 7-109(C) condones non-contingent
payment to expert witnesses if such payment is reasonably measured
by time spent by the expert, difficulty of the problem, and the inconvenience imposed upon the expert. 23 The recognition of a reasonableness requirement in DR 7-109 (C) indicated to the court the ABA's
awareness that any payment to an expert witness might prove an incentive to untruthful testimony. On that basis, the court concluded that
14. 414 F. Supp. at 143.
15. Id. at 141, 144.
16. 414 F. Supp. at 144.
17. Id. at 145.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
21. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1976).
22. The court concluded that the case was partly governed by United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (no denial of due process or equal protection when indigents
are incapable of paying filing fees in bankruptcy proceedings); Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56 (1972) (double-bond prerequisite for appealing a forcible entry and detainer
action a violation of equal protection); and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(denial of due process when indigents incapable of paying court fees denied access to
court in divorce proceedings). 414 F. Supp. at 145.
23. Id. at 146.
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contingent payment to an expert witness will create no more of an incentive for perjury than any other payment if the contingent payment
is reasonable.24 Stated another way, the court found no good reason
for the exclusion of contingency of payment as a relevant factor in a
determination of reasonableness of payment. Thus, when the right to
full and equitable litigation was balanced against a rule of questionable
effectiveness and validity25 that categorically denied a less than affluent
party the right to retain an expert witness, the court determined the application of DR 7-109(C)
to be "too irrational to survive Fourteenth
20
Amendment analysis.
The court in Person did not clearly indicate which form of "Fourteenth Amendment analysis" was applied in the invalidation of DR 7109(C). 27 Under both due process and equal protection analysis the
Supreme Court in recent years has steadfastly employed a balancing
test in cases in which personal and state interests are in conflict.28
Inherent in this balancing test is the necessity that the infringed right
be of a "fundamental" nature, or at least of a certain "constitutional
level. 121 The determination of whether the individual or state right
will take precedence is achieved through a weighing of the significance
that the court gives to the underlying rationales of the two conflicting
interests.'" In the due process cases the state must adduce a "countervailing"'" interest to overcome a claimant's personal right; in the equal
protection cases the state must exhibit a "compelling governmental interest. 312- The distinction is largely one of semantics.
Alternatively, if the right sought to be preserved does not achieve
a level of constitutional importance, the Supreme Court has applied a
rational justification test. 33 Under this less stringent test, the consti24. Id.

25. Id. at 146. The court stated:
The interest in access to the courts on a basis of equality may not exact redress of every imbalance that disparity of means can produce, but it is of such
fundamental importance that it cannot be subjected to a constraint that is not
adapted to effective achievement of its professed goal and which exacts a
sacrifice which must, in any case, be disproportionate to the merely conjectured
probability of occurrence of the wrong aimed at.
Id.
26. Id.
27. See note 22 supra.

28. See cases cited note 6 supra.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973).
30. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-82 (1971); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-38 (1968).
31. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
32. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1968).
33. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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tutionality of a law is upheld upon a showing that it rests upon a nonarbitrary and rational basis. 4
In Boddie v. Connecticut,3" a case upon which the court in Person
heavily relied, appellant welfare recipients challenged Connecticut's requirements for payment of court fees alleging that such costs denied
them access to the courts in their attempt to bring an action for divorce.3 The decision, sounding in due process, recognized the basic
importance to the public interest of the marriage relationship, 37 the indispensability of access to the courts in dissolving a marriage,3 8 and the
state's "monopoly" in the control of the marriage relationship.3 9 Having
established the importance of access to the courts, the Supreme Court
balanced it against any possible countervailing state interest of overriding significance, and, finding none sufficient, 40 ruled that the
requirement of the fee denied appellants due process. The Court,
however, tempered its holding with a caveat:
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a
right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not
be placed beyond the reach of any individual, for . . . in the case
before us this right is the exclusive precondition
to the adjustment
41
of a fundamental human relationship.
Although Boddie was determined solely on due process grounds,
its rationale can be logically applied to cases arising under the equal
protection clause, particularly when the essential grievance to be redressed is that of invidious discrimination whereby a fundamental right
has been denied. 2 The line of demarcation between due process and
34. Id. at 79.
35. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
36. Id. at 372.
37. Id. at 377; see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535 (1942).
38. 401 U.S. at 381 & n.8 (citing Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1056,
296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 87 (Sup. Ct. 1968)).
39. 401 U.S. at 374. These factors led the majority of the Court to the view that
"although [appellants] assert here due process rights as would-be plaintiffs, we think
[their] plight . . . is akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only
forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes." Id. at 376.
40. Id. at 380-82. The state's interests were (1) "prevention of frivolous litigation," (2) "use of court fees and process costs to allocate scarce resources," and (3) the
"balance between the defendant's right to notice and the plaintiff's right to access." Id.
at 381.
41. Id. at 382-83.
42. Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurrence with the result achieved by the majority
in Boddie criticized the mode of decision stating:
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equal protection has never been clearly defined, and, in many instances
both have been applied to the same set of circumstances. a3 In United
States v. Kras,4 4 decided two years after Boddie, the Supreme Court

held that denial to Kras of access to a discharge in bankruptcy due to
his inability to meet fee requirements was not a denial of due process

nor of equal protection of the law. 4' The district court," n relying on
Boddie, had ruled that the required fees served to deny Kras "his Fifth
Amendment right of due process, including equal protection."47 It also
held that a discharge in bankruptcy was a "fundamental interest" that
could be denied only when a "compelling government interest" was
demonstrated. 48 In reversing the district court, the Supreme Court delimited and clarified its holding in Boddie,4" which theretofore had
been seen by some as a gateway to increased procedural rights for indigent civil litigants tantamount to those afforded indigent defendants
0
in criminal actionsY
The Court today puts "flesh" upon the Due Process Clause by concluding that
marriage and its dissolution are so important that an unhappy couple who are
indigent should have access to the divorce courts free of charge ...
An invidious discrimination based on poverty is adequate for this case
• . Affluence does not pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause
for determining who must remain married and who shall be allowed to separate.
Id. at 384-85, 386. Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurrence simply stated: "The validity
of this partial denial . . . can be tested as well under the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
at 388.
43. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (in criminal proceedings due
process requires that all persons have access to the courts; equal protection requires that
the poor have the same access as the wealthy); see, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434 (1973); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
44. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
45. Id. at 443-46.
46. In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
47. Id. at 1212.
48. Id. at 1214.
49. Boddie was distinguished on several grounds: (1) access to courts is not the
only conceivable relief available to bankrupts; (2) the interest in a discharge in
bankruptcy does not attain the same constitutional level of fundamentality as the interest
in the dissolution of the marital relationship; and (3) "[there is no constitutional right
to obtain a discharge of one's debts in bankruptcy." 409 U.S. at 446. The Court, upon
these determinations, found the rational justification test a more appropriate test of the
fee requirement's validity and dispensed with the more stringent fundamental rights test.
Id. at 445-49.
50. See, e.g., Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971), denying cert.
to 225 Ga. 91, 166 S.E.2d 88 (1969), in which Mr. Justice Black, the only dissenter in
Boddie, evidenced a change of heart:
In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only
one crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and each of
the States belong to the people of this country and that no person can be
denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot
pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney ...
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Two predicates emerge from Kras: (1) in civil cases the fundamentality of the right of access to the courts is made contingent upon
the nature of the wrong sought to be redressed; and (2) if the underlying right is not of a substantial constitutional level such as the right to
free speech or marriage the appropriate test is the "rational justifica-

tion" test and not the "compelling governmental interest" test applied
in Boddie.

The court in Person summarily dispensed with Kras in the belief
that that decision was based primarily on the assumption that alternatives
to bankruptcy appeared to be available in that case and that no such al-

ternatives to antitrust litigation are available."' It would appear, however, that there are as many alternatives to antitrust litigation as there

are to bankruptcy.52

Thus Person and Kras are not logically distin-

guishable on this ground and are perhaps even analogous.
It is difficult to ascertain the true nature of the right actually

sought to be protected in Person. The court apparently believed it was
protecting plaintiff's right of access to the courts. 5 3 This- view is some-

what misguided, however, since DR 7-109(C) prohibits payment to expert witnesses on a contingent basis and affects only the quality of the

case, not the right to commence litigation. The deprived litigant is not
54
denied access to the courts, but only the aid of an expert witness.

[P]eople might recognize that this constitutional decision will eventually extend to all civil cases but believe that it can only be enforced slowly . . . so
that the country will have time to absorb its full import.
Id. at 955-56.
51. 414 F. Supp. at 145.
52. The primary alternative offered by the court in Kras was negotiated agreement
with the bankrupt's creditors. The alternative to antitrust litigation would similarly be a
settlement. Neither possibility is particularly viable. Observations such as this led
Justice Black, in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in several access to the court
cases, to conclude that exclusivity of redress in the courts was no limit at all to open
access to the courts. This was premised on the fact that the "States and the Federal
Government hold the ultimate power of enforcement in almost every dispute" and that
"the alternatives [to litigation in other areas of law] are exactly the same as in a divorce
case." Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 956-57 (1971), denying cert. to
225 Ga. 91, 166 S.E.2d 88 (1969).
53. In Person, the court cited as supporting its decision Winters v. Miller, 446
F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971) (forced medication on a woman of questionable sanity in
violation of her belief in the Christian Science faith held violative of her first amendment rights without a prior adjudication of her sanity having been made). 414 F. Supp.
at 146. In Winters the court stated: "Under our Constitution there is no procedural
right more fundamental than the right of the citizen, except in extraordinary circumstances, to tell his side of the story to an impartial tribunal." 446 F.2d at 71.
54. Reliance on the right to an expert witness in Person necessarily imports an
expansion of procedural due process in civil trials. Such procedural rights as this, though
afforded to criminal defendants, have been extended no further than Boddie (as limited
by Kras) permits. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973) (per curiam). The
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Even if the right in issue is conceded to be plaintiff's access to the
courts--on the assumption that denial of an expert essentially denies
one a proper trial-it is apparent, in light of Kras, that in Person that
right cannot be considered to be of a fundamental nature as it was
found to be in Boddie. It is evident that the right to vindicate one's property rights in antitrust litigation is more closely akin to the right to
a discharge in bankruptcy than to the right to the dissolution of a marriage. Like the right to seek a declaration of bankruptcy," the right
to bring an antitrust action"6 is a statutorily created benefit of Congress,
and is not of a constitutional nature.57 Furthermore, in the antitrust
situation, as in the bankruptcy case, there is no "adjustment of . . .
fundamental human relationship[s]" ' at stake as was the case in
Boddie. Consequently New York should only have been required to
show that it had a rational basis in enforcing DR 7-109(C) to the purported disadvantage of impoverished litigants.
On its face, DR 7-109(C) 0 exhibits a compelling state purpose
in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system. The payment to a
witness of an amount contingent upon the outcome of the case and
in some instances upon the favorable content of the witness' testimony
can serve only as an invitation to prevarication. Such concern is magnified in the case of the expert witness whose testimony is "difficult,
often inscrutable and, therefore, especially open to calculated distortion."60 The court in Person, however, attacked not the premise upon
which the rule was based, but the application of the rule in categorically
denying to all litigants, regardless of the intent of the parties or the
reasonableness of the agreement, the ability to retain an expert on a
contingent payment basis. 6
Prior to the ABA's adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969, no specific prohibition against contingent payment to
expert witnesses had been enunciated. Before its amendment in
1937,62 Canon 39, the predecessor to DR 7-109(C), provided that any
general sentiment, however, is to the contrary.
Costs:

See note 49 supra; Note, Litigation

The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo.

L.J. 516 (1968); Note, The

Indigent's Right to Counsel In Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1970).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
57. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973).
58. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971).
59. See note 2 supra.
60. 414 F. Supp. at 142.
61. 414 F. Supp. at 146.

62. ABA

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No.

39.

1977]

DR 7-109(C)

compensation demanded or received by any witness in excess of statutory allowances should be disclosed to the court and adverse counsel.6 3
Implicit in this rule was the possibility that an attorney, if forced to acquire an expert witness on a contingent payment basis, might do so if
the court were informed of the agreement.
In re Schapiro," a New York decision, illustrates the basic
approach that courts have taken in dealing with contingency fees for
expert witnesses. Schapiro, an attorney, was coerced by a physician
into entering a contingent fee agreement on threats that if forced to
appear under subpoena the physician would testify adversely to the attorney's cause unless he were paid one-third of the judgment in the
case."5 At trial, the doctor had testified on cross-examination that he
had no interest in the litigation whatsoever. Schapiro was disbarred
for gross misconduct in acquiescing to the physician's demands and
failing to inform the court of the witness' substantial interest in the
case.6"
Paramount in the Schapiro court's analysis was a judicial concern
for the maintenance of the orderly and efficient administration of justice. Such contingent witness payment contracts, regardless of the
form of the arrangement, were condemned as violative of public policy
in their tendency to promote perjured testimony and unjust awards from
juries unaware of biased testimony. 7 Nevertheless, the court did recognize that the attorney had a duty to inform the court of the unlawful
agreement so that the jury in its consideration of the testimony could
weigh its credibility."
Despite a sparse caselaw foundation,"' it appears that the absolute
prohibition against contingent payment to expert witnesses is founded
on the policy exemplified by In re Schapiro. However, a literal reading
of the rule allows no credence to the implication that informing a jury
63. ABA
WITH

ABA

OPINIONS OF THE COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No.

GRIEVANCES

39.

64. 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N.Y.S. 852 (1911).
65. Id. at 4, 128 N.Y.S. at 855. The physician's testimony was vital in establishing the attorney's client's recovery. See id.
66. Id. at 12, 128 N.Y.S. at 860.
67. Id. at 9, 128 N.Y.S. at 858-59.
68. Id. at 11, 128 N.Y.S. at 859-60.
69. Footnote 90 to DR 7-109(C) makes reference to In re O'Keefe, 49 Mont. 369,
142 P. 638 (1914). O'Keefe dealt solely with contingent payment to ordinary fact
witnesses, not experts, and the court took into consideration O'Keefe's honest intentions
in reducing his penalty from disbarment to suspension for 30 days. It is unusual that no
reference was made to In re Schapiro, a case so solidly in line with the prohibition of the
rule.
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of an expert's interest in the outcome of a case will alleviate the possibility of unjust results from perjured testimony. Nor does the rule allow any review of the intent of the parties or of the particular factors
precipitating the contingent fee arrangement.
In Barnes v. Boatmen's National Bank 0 the Missouri Supreme
Court demonstrated a willingness to examine all aspects of a particular
contingent payment relationship. It upheld a contract for the contingent payment of $25,000 to a psychiatrist testifying in a will contest.
The court rejected the common presumption,"' adopted at least vicariously by the ABA, that every contingent payment contract
with an ex72
pert witness is ipso facto void as against public policy.
Rule 7-109(C) permits reasonable noncontingent compensation
to an expert for his time and labor in preparing to testify. 73 In Person
the court found it irrational that reasonable compensation was permitted but that contingent compensation, regardless of its reasonableness,
would never be permitted. 74 The court's analysis implies that a twenty
percent stake in the outcome of a case would be considered unreasonable, whereas a payment of ten dollars an hour contingent upon success
at trial would be reasonable and therefore permitted. 75 In the former
arrangement the more the expert exaggerated and colored his testimony, the greater would be his compensation; such inducement would
be dissipated in the latter instance. Although the inducement to perjure himself is reduced, the expert is still faced with a win or lose proposition and some incentive to lie remains. On the other hand, there
appears to be no greater inducement to prevarication than is present
in any case involving the testimony of an interested witness such as a
party to the litigation.76 Courts have consistently allowed interested
70. 348 Mo. 1032, 156 S.W.2d 597 (1941).
71. See Laos v. Soble, 18 Ariz. App. 502, 503 P.2d 978 (1972); Burchell v.
Ledford, 226 Ky. 155, 10 S.W.2d 622 (1928); Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 130
N.W. 667 (1911); Griffith v. Harris, 17 Wis. 2d 255, 116 N.W.2d 133, cert. dented, 373
U.S. 927 (1962).
72. 348 Mo. at 1040-41, 156 S.W.2d at 602.
73.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(C) (3).

74. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
75. See 414 F. Supp. at 146, where the court stated: "It is not meant to suggest
that in the case of the expert a fee measured as a percentage of the recovery might not
generally or in particular cases be regarded as per se unreasonable."
76. At common law interested parties were disqualified from testifying on the
premise that their interest in the outcome would induce them to perjure themselves. See,
e.g., Taber v. Perrott & Lee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 39 (1815); DeFarges v. Ryland &
Brooks, 87 Va. 404, 12 S.E. 805 (1891). Exceptions were made, however, in cases
where no other means of proof were available. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 210 (1842).
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witnesses to testify after cautioning the jury about the possible biased

nature of their testimony. 77 There is no logical reason why testimony
of an expert witness paid on a contingent basis could not be conditioned
in the same manner. 8

On its face DR 7-109(C) makes no distinction among different
types of litigation in prohibiting contingent payment to experts. Given
the necessity of expert testimony and the diverse roles experts play in
certain areas of the law, however, it would appear that consideration of

such factors would be warranted in a determination of the propriety
of a contingent fee arrangement.

It is not coincidental that the major-

ity of disputes over contingent payment to expert witnesses have arisen
in the area of personal injury suits.7 9 In such cases the doctor who
treated the plaintiff and who is retained on a contingent fee to give

expert testimony is in a particularly favorable position to perjure himself, since he has personal knowledge of the facts of his client's treatment

to which the opposing party's expert has no access.

These facts may

be exaggerated and distorted by the expert in his formulation of an

opinion about the extent of injuries and length of recovery period in
order to increase the amount of his compensation without serious refutation from an opposing expert. Conversely, in the areas of antitrust
and products liability both experts have equal access to data and facts
from which they formulate opinions, and an objective review of the
veracity of those opinions is available to discount the injurious effects
of one or both experts perjuring themselves.
These observations serve to point out some of the considerations

absent in the ABA's promulgation of DR 7-109(C).

A less rigid appli-

cation of the language of the rule would serve to reduce the unjust

results achieved when a party due to his indigency is categorically de77. The common law prohibition has been put to rest and disqualification by
interest has been removed by statute in almost all jurisdictions in this country. See, e.g.,
Sanderson v. Paul, 235 N.C. 56, 61, 69 S.E.2d 156, 160 (1952); Stream v. Barnard, 120
Ohio 206, 209, 165 N.E. 727, 728 (1929). Renunciation of the prohibition was due to
acceptance of the theory that it is better to receive testimony, however biased, leaving
credibility of witnesses to the jury. Griswold v. Hart, 205 N.Y. 384, 395, 98 N.E. 918,
921-22 (1912).
78. See 31 AM. JUR. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 181 (1967), where it is
stated that "[ilt is generally recognized that the relative weight and sufficiency of expert
and opinion testimony is peculiarly within the province of the jury to decide, considering [inter alia] . . . his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, [and]
whether he is a paid witness .... "
79. E.g., Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 130 N.W. 667 (1911); In re Schapiro,
144 App. Div. 1, 128 N.Y.S. 852 (1911); Davis v. Smoot, 176 N.C. 538, 97 S.E. 488
(1918).
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nied the vital use of an expert at trial. The rule as it stands necessarily
overreaches its purported goal of reducing the possibility of perjury in
that it applies to all instances of contingent payment to an expert, regardless of the motivating factor behind such arrangements and regardless of the particular circumstances of the arrangement.
Nevertheless it is doubtful that such considerations are within the
ambit of constitutional review in this case. The degree of scrutiny that
a statute comes under in testing its rationality is commensurate with the
value and significance of the interest upon which that statute purportedly infringesP-° the higher the value of the interest, the more intense
the scrutiny. An analysis of United States v. Kras revealed that in
an access to the court case the Supreme Court centered its attention
on the right to a discharge in bankruptcy." The right was declared
to be of an economic and social nature and therefore more deference
was granted to the legislative purpose in requiring the payment of court
fees8 2 than was conceded in Boddie where marital rights were involved.
Because marital rights are protected under the first amendment, the
court utilized a more intense scrutiny of the statute requiring payment
83
of court fees to find that requirement unconstitutional.
Like the right to a discharge in bankruptcy, the right to bring an
antitrust action is an economic right. Therefore if there is some rational basis for a law that infringes upon that right, the court will not scrutinize the application of the law intensely but will defer to what appears
on the face of the statute to be a rational justification.8 4 DR 7-109(C)
clearly exhibits a rational basis in upholding the principles of judicial
and legal ethics and in its concomitant objective of reducing fraud and
perjury in civil proceedings. If precedents such as Cohen v. Beneficial
80. CI. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 658-63 (9th
ed. 1975) (summarizing old and new forms of equal protection analysis).
81. See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
82. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 447-48 (1973).
83. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 380-82 (1971).
84. Dictum in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1948), exhibited the
Supreme Court's reluctance to delve into the intricacies and theories supporting a state
law if the law were shown to have a rational basis. Petitioners in Cohen challenged the
constitutionality of a New Jersey statute requiring small shareholders bringing stockholders' derivative actions to post security for expenses incurred by the corporation in
prosecuting the action. In upholding the statute on equal protection and due process
grounds, the Court found sufficient justification for the law in its positive action taken
toward alleviating the corporation's burden of dealing with fraudulent suits. And though
other plausible means for achieving the result desired were feasible, the Court did not
invalidate the state legislation because it failed "to embody the highest wisdom or provide
the best conceivable remedies." Id. at 550-51. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485-87 (1970).
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Loan Corp.85 that exhibit extreme deference to legislative purpose are
given credence, alternatives to the rule will warrant little consideration
in the face of a rule replete with valid, justifiable objectives and the
support of a vast majority of cases.
However, the deferential manner in which a court might deal with
this issue should not preclude a reconsideration of the policy behind
DR 7-109(C). It is apparent that in many instances the prohibition
of the rule does render an injustice. If contingent payment to expert
witnesses were tempered by requirements that the payment be reasonable and that there be full disclosure to the court, jury and opposing
counsel, such agreements could be permissible.
Although the decision in Personhas no further jurisdictional reach
than the boundaries of the Eastern District of New York, it may spark
the ABA and state bar associations to institute changes in DR 7-109
(C). Total revocation of the rule would inevitably lead to abuses of
a privilege that should be reserved for exceptional situations. Retention
of the rule and its arbitrary and categorical denial of expert testimony
to those who cannot afford such testimony is itself an abuse of justice.
Difficulty of administration should not prevent the amendment of a rule
unyielding in its absolute denial of the only means an indigent plaintiff
might have for obtaining fair treatment at trial.
MICHAEL

A. HEEDY

Taxation-The Twilight Zone of Charity: The IRS Denies Exemption for a Free Tax Planning Service Under Section 501(c)(3)
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) exercises a major influence
over the development of public charities through its power to charac1
terize an organization as "charitable" under section 501(c)(3) of the
85. 337 U.S. 541 (1948); see note 84 supra.
1. I.R.C. § 501 provides in part:
(a) EXEMPTION FROM TAxATIoN.-An organization described in subsection (c) . . . shall be exempt from taxation ....

(c) LIsT OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS. ....
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organ-

